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Abstract
Freight exchanges are central to the logistics industry, as they reduce empty runs and meet spot demands.
To improve their efficiency in terms of automation and
enhance trust between the participants, we propose a
decentralized freight exchange implemented using public blockchains. With our solution, we also address
shortcomings of public blockchains, such as scalability
and privacy. We present two artifacts: a general architecture for an electronic logistics marketplace (ELM)
and a concrete implementation as the proof of concept
for a freight exchange. The solution is implemented using two off-the-shelf public blockchains and a public
distributed file system. Additionally, we investigate the
implications for the general ELM model and show that
an ELM based on a blockchain can be viewed as infrastructure rather than a market participant.

1. Introduction
Truck transport is central to our industry, since, at least
for the last mile, most freight is moved via trucks. In the
European Union, around 20% of all truck kilometers are
for empty runs [11]. Through this, up to €100 billion
costs of unused capacity were generated in 2016 [33].
This also harms the environment, as hazardous greenhouse gases are emitted unnecessarily while transporting nothing.
Freight exchanges (FX), which are ELMs [13], decrease
these costs. These are used to quickly meet spot demands for truckloads [7], allowing empty trucks to be
loaded by providing digital blackboards on which shippers can post their transportation demands and carriers
can submit bids. FX are mainly involved in the arbitrage
of services and not in their processing [12].
Land-transport margins are minimal (1.8%–5.7% in
2018 [10]), and every intermediary, such as a FX, in the
chain of transport further decreases these [47]. Key issues with transportation reported in the literature [19]
were reliance on the phone as the most important means
of communication, difficulties in establishing trust with
carriers, and reservations with central platforms due to
privacy and neutrality concerns [12]. Trust between
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parties is a significant issue, since valuable freight is entrusted to a potentially unknown carrier, and freight theft
is a serious problem [5] in FX. More than 60 FX exist in
Europe. Connecting to all of them is expensive. Payments are usually made within 30–60 days, potentially
causing liquidity problems for carriers as well as effort
involved in chasing payments.
Electronic logistics marketplaces should have provided
the solution; however, many problems remain unresolved. Electronic logistics marketplaces are operated
by technology providers (TPs) [46]. Addressing the
above problems might be a task for the TP or a consortium of market participants. Both solutions would add
additional transaction costs. However, with public
blockchains, a technology exists that can run transactions autonomously through smart contracts [42] with a
minimal ram-up cost increase for the participants, so
TPs can be replaced with technology. However, public
blockchains involve scalability and privacy issues [8,
25, 34], which may explain why minimal research is
conducted on FX running on blockchains. We aimed to
close this research gap by answering the following research questions: first, we aimed to develop an architecture for a decentralized, robust, extensible, efficient, and
scalable FX. Second, how can a FX be made public
while maintaining the privacy of participants? Third,
how can trust be created between participants?
Our contribution comprises two artifacts created following the design science research (DSR) approach. The
first is an architecture for establishing an ELM on blockchains that addresses the issues of scalability and privacy. As the second artifact, we evaluated the theoretical architecture via the creation and evaluation of a prototype, generating valuable knowledge for a technical as
well as a managerial audience. Creating and evaluating
prototypes with DSR is common practice when investigating blockchain solutions [3, 27, 32] but is new to
ELMs, since no similar research has yet been published.
Using blockchains enables us to extend the traditional
model of ELMs with one that can be operated by unknown and untrusted participants in open and closed
configurations without a TP, thus making the ELM an
infrastructure rather than a participant.

Page 5587

The paper is structured following the related DSR
guidelines [14]. First, we introduce prior work, discuss
the research method used, describe the first artifact, and
evaluate it with the second artifact and further examinations. The paper ends with a discussion of the results and
the conclusion.

2. Background
2.1. Electronic Marketplaces
Much research has been conducted on electronic marketplaces (EMs) [15]. One of the first definitions of an
EM was provided by Bakos [2]: an EM is “an interorganizational information system that allows the participating buyers and sellers to exchange information about
prices and product offerings.” Four phases can be distinguished in the interactions within an EM [36, 37]. A
buyer obtains information about an offering that a seller
provides in the information phase. The trading phase
starts with the submission of an offer, may involve negotiation between the buyer and seller, and ends with a
binding contract. The transaction ends in the settlement
phase with the exchange of goods/services and payments. The after-sales phase “involves after-sales product support, customer service, and evaluation of the
transaction’s outcome” [36].
A specific EM concerned with logistics services is the
ELM. An ELM consists of “shippers, carriers and technology providers” [46]. An ELM may be open to different participants or closed (i.e., only open for a selected
group) [15]. Most traditional FX are open ELMs [40],
where an unlimited number of known and unknown participants can interact [15] while mainly using single
modes of transport without added services [45]. Closed
ELMs frequently established for a certain industry involve smaller groups where participants are known and
connected, more information is exchanged, and collaboration occurs [15].

Figure 1 EM models [45]
Wang explored [44-46] the characteristics of closed
ELMs and categorized them into four types according to
the connectivity structure between the participants. The
centralized market represents an open ELM where participants are coordinated via bidding and pricing systems. In the traditional hierarchical coordination, a shipper creates a private marketplace to serve their

requirements. In the modified hierarchical coordination,
one platform is used by several shippers to interact with
carriers, and some collaboration between shippers already occurs. In the heterarchical network, much collaboration occurs between shippers with a significantly
customized network design to meet the shippers’ requirements. Wang states that the heterarchical network
might provide the highest flexibility and efficiency [46],
as it combines the strengths of open and closed ELMs.
Schwind [38] highlights the limitations of current
ELMs, stating that they mainly provide support in the
information phase while omitting data concerning the
participants and their financial solidity and offering poor
data security.

2.2. Blockchain
Bitcoin [26], introduced in 2009, was the first commercial blockchain with a protocol to transfer value via a
distributed immutable ledger. Transactions are organized in blocks, created by miners, who must solve a
computational problem to tamper-proof the chain. This
mechanism, known as proof of work, is used as part of
a consensus algorithm that results in only seven transactions per second.
Anyone can join a public permissionless blockchain
[53]. However, private blockchains require participants
to obtain authorization to enter them. Consensus can be
achieved via proofs that are much more rapidly executed
(e.g., proof of stake or practical Byzantine fault tolerance), but trust is required between the participants or
between the participants and a central entity. Public
chains [8] cannot be altered by a single entity, while this
is mainly untrue for private chains. No trust between the
participants is required, since the consensus algorithm is
built for an environment with untrusted parties.
Second-generation blockchains [51] enable the use of
smart contracts [42], which are executed during block
creation by the participants in the blockchain. Ethereum
[6, 48] is the most important Turing-complete blockchain of this type. Smart contracts must always produce
the same results when run, since many miners execute
them simultaneously to create blocks. Thus, no external
state must be accessed, because this could lead to different results for each execution. To add the external state
to a smart contract, oracles [50] can be used.
Newer generations of blockchains attempt to overcome
the limits of scalability, such as the public IOTA [31]
protocol, where transactions are linked via a directed
acyclic graph data structure, called tangle, to achieve
high throughput. Since no miners are involved, no fees
are incurred. By continuously removing unwanted
transactions, IOTA sacrifices some of its immutability
for the sake of performance.
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Blockchains are not well suited to store larger files such
as freight documents. The InterPlanetary File System
(IPFS) [4] is a distributed file system that allows decentralized file storage. A property of this is the immutability of files. Files are referenced by their hash value, so a
file behind a certain address will always be the same.
Ideas for using the IPFS as a store to offload data from
the main chain were discussed [52]. Here, a custom
blockchain is required, which would be counter to our
goal to use standard components. Another approach to
storing Internet of Things data in the IPFS as a side
chain was conducted [1]. Ethereum and Monax were
used as a consortium chain that enabled access to the
data packages in the IPFS. However, the architecture is
limited to a private blockchain, since the mechanism of
updating the data might cause scalability problems.
Privacy is an issue that still requires resolution in public
blockchains. Since all nodes contain a copy of all data,
no private information should be stored in them. We
needed to investigate the metadata, such as the transactions, the content that is part of the transactions, and the
state stored on the chain. Much research was conducted
concerning the metadata. Protocol extensions exist that
require off-chain computation, third parties, much computation, and coordination using, e.g., Hawk [22] or
Enigma [54]. A set of algorithms called zero-knowledge
proofs [30] allows one party to prove that they possess
a secret without revealing it. This can be used to hide
parts of transactions and enable complete anonymity.
None of these can currently be executed efficiently on a
smart-contract-enabled blockchain [8]. They also require a trusted setup, which the participants must accept.
No research has been conducted on placing a FX on a
blockchain. Since ELMs are a subset of EMs, we investigated their concepts. For example, Notheisen [27] created a marketplace for used cars on a public blockchain
to replace a central register with a decentralized solution. This included a component for trade as well as a
register and a process for registration. Others seeking
similar approaches in different fields of application followed a schema using Ethereum as a main chain, with
some adding a side chain [18, 20, 24, 28]; these lack
scalability, because the requirement of being able to
place many offers for one service request would not
scale with the proposed architectures. Moreover, privacy is not well implemented, as the transactions can be
tracked. More privacy-aware concepts [23, 41] exist that
allow part of a sale or reviews to be anonymous; however, these systems require specialized blockchains or
must be executed on private blockchains. Moreover,
auctions [43] were implemented using a blockchain;
however, scalability and privacy were not sufficiently
addressed.

3. Method

The research was conducted following the DSR [17] and
related guidelines [14]. This method was chosen because we aimed to develop a novel technical solution for
decentralized organization of freight order allocation.
We followed the guidelines for design science [17]: we
introduced an architecture (model) for a ELM that could
also be used in a more general sense for other service
exchanges. To evaluate the validity of the architecture,
we introduced a model instantiation as an additional artifact.
The problem relevance is high. Currently, only centralized FX are available. Considering the negative effect of
empty runs on the climate and the economy, a decentralized FX might prevent some of these. Since no such FX
currently exists, our approach might solve a crucial
problem.
Through the implementation, we conducted a design
evaluation. In simulations, we calculated the cost of
transactions and showed via a deductive process that the
required privacy was achieved. We defined use cases
that were tested using test scripts. Additionally, we validated the scalability promises of the involved components.
Our research contribution is an architecture that can be
applied to a FX as well as to other areas where multistep
negotiations can be conducted independently of the negotiation result, which must remain private and immutable in a distributed ledger. We provided a blueprint on
how to implement decentralized, scalable, open, and privacy-aware FX. We also investigated the consequences
of using a blockchain on the ELM model.
We ensured research rigor by following the DSR process and principles and by using a structure suggested in
the literature [14]. To validate the model, an instantiation was created, which was additionally validated
through automated tests.
In DSR, design is a search process. Both artifacts were
created through iterations. The insights from the model
instantiation influenced the model adjustment to better
fit the state of the problem environment, as described in
the evaluation section.
The results of this research are presented through this
paper as well as through presentations to the beneficiaries of this study in a managerial setting.

4. Artifact Description and Architecture
To verify whether a blockchain should be used, several
similar decision models are available [29, 49]. A flow
chart determines which blockchain to use, if any [49].
We store state, have multiple writers (our participants),
and do not wish to trust a third party. Our writers are not
known centrally and no trust exists between them. Since
public verifiability is an important property of our architecture, we were guided to use a public blockchain.
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The architecture was designed via an iterative process,
regularly testing it with the prototype. We were guided
by the design process for blockchains by Xu [51] to
evaluate different options in the implementation, which
then influenced the architecture. Layering the data store
was also inspired by a literature study [16].

4.1. Architecture
The ELM model [46] involves a shipper (S) who requests a service and wishes to obtain offers from carriers
(Cs). The S selects an offer and the C executes the service. To authorize payments for the service, the service
quality must be verified and reported back to the exchange. To achieve this, the ELM model must be extended to include a validator (V) who performs that role.
In contrast to the ELM model, we replaced the TP with
the blockchain.
The data repositories are divided into three layers. The
management layer maps the information phase, settlement phase, and after-sales phase of the EM model [36,
37]. The negotiation layer is used to store the process
of establishing the contracts, mapping the negotiation
phase of the EM model [37]. The binary large object
(BLOB) store is used to securely store bulk data.
The durability and cost decrease with each layer of data
stores. In the first layer, the highest durability is required, because this is where the payments are made. No
money should be lost. This will also be the most expensive layer, as durability increases the storage price. For
the other layers, some of the durability can be sacrificed,
since the negotiation data is only important while the
contract is unsigned, and data in the BLOB storage only
needs to be downloaded once. Afterwards, it can be confirmed which data was available when the contract was
signed.
The management layer holds the signed contracts, the
money, information about the Cs, and a repository with
references to the negotiation layer. After the contracted
services are conducted, payments should be released.
Thus, the implementing blockchain technology requires
the ability to execute smart contracts so that the payments can be released automatically without involvement from the S, which requires the necessary information to be available in this layer. Since the cost of
storing data in this layer is high, the minimum amount
of data is stored. The data in the management layer is
organized in the following repositories:
Signed contracts repository This holds the contracts.
Its properties are payment amount, due date for the service completion, C, S, and V.
C/S/V repository This contains information about the
Cs, Ss, and Vs. Its properties are unique identifier, public key, name, and link to the BLOB store with further
information.

Service request repository list Here, Ss store references to their service request lists in the negotiation
layer. Cs use this as a root for their search for service
requests. Its properties are unique identifier, owner,
name, link to negotiation layer, and minimum deposit.
Deposit repository Here, a C can deposit money for an
S so that the S can collect the money in case of an exception in the service. Its properties are S, C, amount,
and valid until.
The negotiation layer stores the service requests and
offers. The implementing technology must support the
speed of data changes and have low operating costs because of the larger amount of data. Additionally, the negotiation layer is used to determine who can access the
service request list. The repositories of the negotiation
layer are as follows:
Service request list This contains a list of service requests from one or many Ss as well as the quotes from
the Cs. A service request must contain all the information necessary to enable a C to make a binding offer.
Additional documents are references in the BLOB store.
The list must be encrypted. The S can provide access to
interested parties by providing the necessary key. The C
sends encrypted quotes that only the S or, depending on
the operation mode, the other Cs of the service request
list can read.
Service request list approval queue Here, the C can
request access to a service request list by providing a
public key. The S uses this to provide the encrypted access keys to the service request list. The public key provided here is not required to be the same as that in the C
repository.
The last layer is the BLOB store for storing large data
objects. These objects are referenced from the other layers. It must be possible to prove that the file stored in the
BLOB store is the one referenced from the other stores.
This implies that the files in the BLOB store must be
immutable, as the references are immutable as a property of a blockchain. The data here should be encrypted.
One goal of this research was to develop a process without media disruption to maintain low transaction costs.
Therefore, the payment must also be conducted on the
blockchain. Since native blockchain cryptocurrencies
are often highly volatile [35], a more stable currency is
required. Therefore, in this case, an optional token
should be used that can be exchanged at a stable price
for fiat money.
The final component of the exchange is the client software, which provides a user interface.
Protocols
The protocol is divided into the following categories:
setup management, service request handling, contract
management, and exception handling.
Setup Management
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Creation of a carrier, shipper, or validator If a new
C, S, or V wishes to join the exchange, they must register with the public registry. This is necessary to allow
the participants to build trust between each other. This
allows a C to prove successful contract executions, because only they can produce the matching public key offered in their profile.
Creation of a service request registry Service request
registries can be only created by any S registered in the
S repository, so that it is clear who created it.
Service Request Handling
Creating service requests The S adds a signed service
request to one of its service request lists so that the
origin of the request is provable. The request data defines the exact information required to offer a price for
the service. The request might also contain data to enhance collaboration between the participants, such as
forecasts for further shipments.
Each service request is valid for a certain time. It also
has a deadline by which the service must be started and
another by which it must be completed. The S also specifies the validator that must be used to validate the correct service execution. For a service exception, the S
also specifies an amount the C must pay if they do not
provide the service.

Figure 2 The architecture of the ELM
Finding service requests The C can find service requests by browsing the service request list repository.
From there, they can check the service request lists for
new service requests.
Accessing a service request list and handshake To access the service request list, a C must send a request to
the service request approval queue. The request is encrypted with the public key of the S. This contains a
newly generated public key that the C must use in this
service request list as well as the unique identifier that
the C used in the C repository. The S can now validate
how much money the C deposited, who they are, and
how many contracts they completed successfully. The S
can then decide to send the C the address as well as the
access key to the service request list in a message encrypted with the public key the C sent in this message
exchange.
Responding to a service request with a quote The C
attaches one or more quotes to a service request encrypted with the public key of the S. The offers may
have a date until which they are valid.
Contract Management

Accepting an offer The S selects a winning offer by
sending a message to the service request list. The part
showing that the service request is closed is visible to
the participants of the service request list, while the part
pointing to the documents with the service details is encrypted with the public key used in the service request
list of the winning C. The S then creates a contract on
the management layer containing a hash value that identifies the service request and the winning quote. This can
be used later to prove which terms lead to the contract
without exposing the data to the public. The S must also
send tokens to the contract so that the contract is paid on
completion regardless of whether the S remains solvent.
Service completion and payment On service completion, the validator specified in the contract is called by
the C or by other means (e.g., the service beneficiary or
a GPS tracker on reaching the destination) to validate
service completion. The validator confirms whether the
service was conducted as specified. If the service was
completed correctly, the validator triggers the service
contract to release the funds to the SP.
Exception Handling Trust between the participants can
be achieved through both the immutability properties of
blockchain and the risk management undertaken by both
parties. For cases where the service was not executed as
agreed, clear rules must be established to resolve the situation on chain to minimize transaction costs. The main
idea behind our resolution strategy is for the C to deposit
funds into the contract that can be withdrawn by the S
in case of noncompliance with the contract. The amount
of compensation is defined in the service request. Every
party can precisely assess the financial risks they are
willing to take. This also addresses the goal of creating
trust between the participants. When the contract is not
validated by the validator within the defined time frame,
the S can claim the agreed amount from the funds deposited by the C through the smart contract.
Similarly, the C can claim a payment if, for example, the
S did not allow the C to provide the service. However,
no automated process can be offered here, as it is impossible to efficiently prove the misbehavior of the S on
chain. Involving a third party would result in additional
overheads and might not be an economically valid option. Therefore, the S must approve this claim. Since the
whole interaction is stored on chain, it might benefit the
S to approve a claim to earn the trust of other Cs.

5. Evaluation
The general design decision for the prototype was to
build on standard components to support the reliability
and stability goals and increase acceptance by the users.
Ethereum is used for the management layer, as it is the
most successful blockchain in terms of market capitalization (coinmarketcap.com), supporting smart contracts
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and offering both high durability and reliable security
[32]. The smart contracts were created using the Solidity
language. As the internal currency, an ERC20-compliant token was created to be compatible with public token
exchanges.
The remainder of the contracts on Ethereum is divided
between the repositories, service request repository list,
service contract handling, and exception handling, as
specified in the general architecture. The repositories
contain the handling of shippers, carriers, and oracles
(validator) allowing self-registration. The data required
for the registration is the name, IPFS address containing
further description, and a public key (elliptic curve cryptosystem [21] to save space compared to RSA). The service request repository list contains the list of service
request repositories, which each contain an owner,
name, IOTA address of the service request repository,
and a minimal amount that must be deposited to access
the list. Any shipper can create such a list. The part residing on Ethereum is governed by smart contracts,
since financial transfers must be reliable and depend on
the agreement between the parties and not their willingness to cooperate.
Ethereum alone cannot scale cost, speed, or volume. Because of its speed and scalability, resulting from its
leaner approach to the consensus algorithm, we chose
IOTA for the negotiation layer, as adding transactions
to the tangle involves no direct cost. Since IOTA does
not offer smart contracts, compliance with the rules is
achieved through a protocol and encryption; IOTA offers the second-layer masked authenticated messaging
(MAM) protocol on top of the tangle, which is essentially a linked list where messages are encrypted and
signed. Anyone who has a seed key can add elements to
these lists.
The IOTA tangle contains the service request list approval queue and a service request list, which are used
as described in the general architecture. To encrypt the
service requests, the symmetric block cipher, advanced
encryption standard (AES [9]), is used, so one key can
be shared with all participants, since quote requests
should be accessible to them, regardless of when they
joined. The key is shared during the handshake, when a
carrier is approved to join a service request list.
A service request contains the minimal data required for
a carrier to create a quote (e.g., a postal code but no concrete delivery address) and an ID that is unique to the
list. A carrier might reply with a signed quote message
encrypted with the public key of the shipper.
To accept a quote, the shipper posts a message divided
into two parts, one of which is unencrypted and shows
the quote ID as well as the type of the message, notifying the participants that no further quotes are required.
The second part is encrypted and contains an IPFS address pointing to an AES-encrypted BLOB (e.g., PDF

document) with the detailed instructions for the carrier
and the accompanying AES key.
The negotiation layer only enforces compliance in posting service requests and quotes and enables the shipper
to control who can participate in their section of the FX.
At this point, incentives for compliance in executing the
service must be set with the promise for payment. This
is performed using the smart-contract-enabled
Ethereum. In executing smart contracts, data storage is
the most expensive component, since the data must be
stored on every node participating in the blockchain.
The minimal information that must be stored is how
many tokens a shipper transfers to a carrier, which vali-

Figure 3 The web client with the carrier, validator
(oracle) registries, service request view, and, on the
right, the summary of a shipment before it is signed.
dator should be able to release it, and for how long this
promise is valid as well as a reference to the quote request. Since the tokens are deducted from the shipper’s
account, the carrier can be sure that they will be paid if
they provide their service and persuade the validator to
release the payment. The carrier cannot stop this process
after filing this contract on the blockchain.
In our implementation, the validator is a service that
creates a QR code (ISO/IEC 18004:2015) that the shipper can give to the receiver of the shipment. Once the
shipment arrives, the receiver scans the QR code, which
encodes a URL secured by a JSON web token (RFC
7519), which then triggers the validator to release the
payment on the blockchain.
The IPFS is a distributed file system that offers immutability and verifiability for a specific named resource,
and it is free of charge, as it is peer-to-peer-based and
therefore a good fit for the BLOB layer.
Additionally, we created a web-based client (based on
Java, Spring Boot, and Angular), which can be used by
the parties to allow easier access to the blockchains (see
Figure 3). In designing the web client, we also created
57 automated tests to validate the functionality of the
platform. To better understand how the platform can be
used, we also created a complex demonstration setup
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with demonstration data to allow presentation of the results to a wider business audience as part of the DSR
process. The web client is a stateless (the state is on the
blockchain) multi-user application that can be run on the
user’s computer. The remainder of the platform is executed on the blockchain. The design goal of a decentralized application is thus achieved.
The platform was designed in several phases. First, we
gathered business knowledge from our business partners
through interviews. We then reviewed the literature on
the state of the current research as well as searching the
internet for solutions to the problem. This process led to
an initial architecture artifact. Through the implementation, several changes in the initial architecture were required, as assumptions required revision. Particularly,
the speed of Ethereum required us to minimize both the
initial data model of the contract representation and the
extension with IOTA. For the most used data structures
in the management layer (contracts), we only stored IDs,
and even the validity date was reduced to a number representing the days since the FX creation.

5.1. Scalability
The next step to validating the architecture was to calculate the cost of transactions on Ethereum, since only
these incur direct costs. The contract creation and release of payments are most frequently used. Registrations to the exchange as a C, S, or V would be mainly
one-time operations.
Operation

Gas
(103)
60.8
36.5
52.0
79.5
268.8
304.3

Slow
<30min
0.043€
0.026€
0.037€
0.056€
0.191€
0.216€

Normal
<5 min
0.086€
0.052€
0.074€
0.113€
0.381€
0.431€

Create contract
Release payment by V
batch of two
batch of four
Registration carrier / V
Registration shipper
Exception handling
request money (C-> S)
47.9
0.034€ 0.068€
obtain money (C-> S)
42.3
0.030€ 0.060€
stake (S-> C)
51.6
0.037€ 0.073€
claim stake (S-> C)
38.5
0.027€ 0.055€
Add service request list 191.7
0.136€ 0.272€
Create FX
4,460
3.163€ 6.325€
Table 1 Cost on Ethereum. Assumptions: slow execution 5 gwei, normal execution 10 gwei; based on
ethgasstation.info, gitcoin.co/gas/history
As shown in Table 1, the cost of handling a shipment
would be around 0.07–0.14 €, depending on how fast we
require the transactions to be processed. Moving one
Euro-pallet from Berlin to Madrid costs around 150 €
(price calculator at a logistics company); this would be
around 0.05% of the cost that would be added through
the FX. As a percentage, this amount appears minimal.

Comparing the cost to that of self-hosting, where infrastructure, servers, and personal maintenance must be
paid for, this is minimal. Even creating the whole FX
does not cost more than 7 EUR. From an economic
viewpoint, the FX appears scalable.
Scalability also depends on the blockchain capacity.
Although the IOTA protocol should contain no limiting
factors, we validated the promise of scalability. To add
a new transaction to the network, a small proof of work
must be computed by the client. We tested the scalability with the largest piece of data from our protocol, the
request for an offer, which is around
500 bytes, and we sent it via the MAM protocol to the
tangle. We utilized the Amazon Web Services cloud,
sending 1,000 requests for offers to the tangle to determine whether the number of transactions per second increased with the computing power.
We correctly assumed that with more computing power,
the number of transactions processed within a given
time frame would increase almost linearly (Table 2).
The IPFS is a distributed peer-to-peer file system. In
contrast with the blockchains, the data is not stored by
every node or client. The clients only help to find the
data via a distributed hash table (DHT) in the network
and decide independently whether they wish to store the
data as a copy. Since it is trivial to run an IPFS client
that delivers the data, every FX participant enhances the
network; therefore, it scales sufficiently. To further validate this claim, we created a server running an IPFS
node in the USA and an IPFS node in Germany. On the
server in the USA, we created 1,000 random files with a
size of 200 kB, which corresponds to around 50 pages
of a PDF file. We added the files to the IPFS and then
tried to download them in Germany via the IPFS protocol. This was possible with a short delay that often lasted
only a few seconds but did not exceed 2 minutes. The
time required to find the file depended on how well the
peers were connected and how many other peers were
already storing the file. The transfer was instant when
the two peers exchanging the files were connected directly. Additionally, we reviewed a study on the IPFS
performance [39], which shows that for our small file
sizes, the scalability of the IPFS is sufficient.
Requests for offers / s
Number of instances
0.79
2x c4.8xlarge
1.41
4x c4.8xlarge
2.62
8x c4.8xlarge
Table 2 Results of the experiment on IOTA.
In Ethereum, the capacity is limited by the gas consumption allowed while creating a block, which is constantly
adjusted by the Ethereum community. The highest number of transactions achieved in one day was 1.3 million
in January 2018. The current rate is around 0.6 million
transactions, indicating that the network retains some
capacity. The gas used limits the transactions, which is

Page 5593

currently around 45 × 109 per day with peaks reaching
60 × 109. For the naïve case, the contract creation and
release of payments for around 100,000 transactions
would be possible with a gas usage of 10 × 109, which
would fit into the gap and could be handled by the blockchain. Around 20%1 more transactions would be enabled by releasing the payments in batches, as the cost of
21,000 gas [48] for calling a smart contract would occur
only once. No data is available regarding how much
freight is processed per day on current FX. Some exchanges publish the number of daily offers with no reference to time (when the number was achieved; how
many contracts were closed; maximum vs. average per
day). Considering these numbers, the median is around
100,000 shipments per day. Conducting the test runs on
the Ethereum main net would provide minimal insight,
since it is already known that the protocol is constrained
in terms of capacity, and this would also be costly. Furthermore, tests on the test net or a private Ethereum
blockchain, which we have conducted, would not be insightful, because these have other characteristics.
The blockchains involved are robust and stable. Altering
their reliability might be difficult, as the nodes comprising them are distributed around the world. Ethereum has
over 3,500 and IOTA more than 150 active nodes; for
the IPFS, it would be trivial to run a node that only
serves the local content on users’ computers.

5.2. Privacy
Preserving anonymity is important. Both the shipper and
carrier can create as many accounts as they wish in the
Ethereum blockchain. None of the accounts is required
to be bound to an identity. Thus, for a third party considering the transactions on the chain, it is impossible to
determine identities. Only the parties involved in a
transaction see the identity of their counterpart. Ultimately, not even the shipper is required to be identified,
since the carrier only requires to know that they will be
paid. However, if a shipper wishes to be more confident
that the carrier will conduct the service appropriately,
they could ask the carrier to show them successful contracts on the blockchain. This could be simply achieved,
since the carrier could sign a proof with the key used for
the transactions. A service automating this process
could be another opportunity for extending the FX without changing the protocol and thus increasing trust.
This study did not address the exchange of tokens for
fiat money, since exchanges exist that provide this service. By observing the tokens, one might deduct the
identities of the Cs when they are exchanged into fiat
money. However, exchanges often have random
1

𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒(𝑛) = 52006 + (𝑛 − 2) ∗ 13763 + 𝑛 ∗
60754; 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒(𝑛) = 𝑛 ∗ (36528 + 60754); with 𝑛 =

addresses to send the tokens to that only they can connect to an owner. Additionally, the token exchange
could offer an off-chain service that would directly exchange tokens locked in contracts, leaving no traces on
the public chain. The account owner could easily prove
that they own the coins using a public key mechanism.
Moreover, tokens could be exchanged between Cs and
Ss, since the Ss generally require tokens and the Cs have
them. This represents another opportunity to extend the
architecture.

5.3. Extensibility
It would also be possible to integrate loans to finance
transport via tokens. Services for this already exist in the
Ethereum ecosystem. Other BLOB stores could be used
without changing the protocol. While maintaining a stable management layer, the negotiation layer could be extended using a different blockchain, since in the architecture, the link from the service request list repository
can point to any type of target.
The protocol does not prescribe how the validator
should be implemented. It only provides an interface
that enables arbitrary validator implementations. Other
even more automated validators could be implemented
with a GPS tracking device attached to the shipment.
Once the device enters the destination, it can call a validator to trigger release of the payment. Another extension might be an insurance that would act as a validator.
When signing a contract, the shipper would pay the insurance validator while enabling it to access information
about the shipment. If the cargo did not arrive, all the
required information would be available to the insurance
to allow the losses to be covered.

6. Discussion
An ELM on a blockchain replaces the TP as one of three
participants [45] with technology. In Wang’s model the
TP involves cost for the participants. The blockchain
model enables an infrastructure with fewer overheads,
since the TP is not involved. Our architecture enables
the shippers but not the TP to choose between an open
or closed ELM or even to use both. Wang [46] argues
that this would be desirable, as this would enable efficiency and economies of scale (closed) and flexibility
and speed (open). Our architecture enables the participants to work in centralized markets and heterarchical
ELMs depending on the requirements.
The roles in the blockchain ELM do not need to be
fixed, as a C can be a carrier in one list and a shipper in
a different list, utilizing their network to resell orders
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 and 𝑛 ≥ 2; for 𝑛 → ∞, 23,4% gas can be
saved
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enabling multimodal transport, as our architecture does
not restrict this. Föhring [12] adds the problem of finding a neutral TP for the FX and suggests an agent-based
system as a solution. Here, our blockchain architecture
might provide a suitable infrastructure on which to run
the agent-based system.
The blockchain enables better process digitalization, as
all phases of the EM are implemented on one technology
layer, giving better cost efficiency in contrast to the information phase alone [38]. Electronic logistics marketplaces threaten the business of traditional freight forwarders [38]. These often buy capacity on the market
and therefore function as another intermediary, like the
ELM. When the ELM is on a blockchain, no single party
directly gains from higher usage of the ELM; therefore,
it changes from a competitor to an infrastructure. Carriers fear transparency through ELMs [13, 38], leading to
lower prices. This effect may not be influenced by the
change in the underlying technology; however, further
research is required.
To achieve scalability and privacy, we separated the
three areas: smart contracts, negotiation data, and file
storage. This implies a design compromise, since having
all the data in one system would make it possible to ensure that participants follow the rules, since the smart
contracts control every transaction. The compromise is
ultimately smaller than it appears. Although a S could
create arbitrary contracts and collect the deposited
money from the Cs, this might result in loss of trust from
the Cs because of the immutable transaction log.
Considering the technologies used, some limitations remain. Although we heavily optimized the protocol,
Ethereum remains a limiting factor in terms of scalability. Further developments on Ethereum 2.0 are in progress, which should allow much improved scalability.

7. Conclusions
Freight exchanges are important instruments in the logistics industry, as they avoid empty runs and meet spot
demands. However, they have many drawbacks, such as
lack of automation, lack of transparency, difficulty in
extending, high cost, and lack of trust between participants. This study shows how these issues can be overcome by creating a FX on public blockchains, while
maintaining the scalability of the solution and the required data privacy. As blockchains have their own
shortcomings, such as scalability and privacy, we extracted three research questions. These were addressed
by creating two artifacts in a DSR process and evaluating the results. We thoroughly analyzed the scalability
aspect of the solution during the evaluation. Additionally, the exchange should be open not only to participants but also to third parties who wish to extend it. We
showed examples of how this can be achieved with this

architecture. Since trust is a crucial aspect when moving
freight, we also elaborated on how trust is enhanced
with the decentralized FX. We provide a blueprint for
building decentralized, scalable, privacy-aware, and extensible ELMs that can act as an infrastructure for the
logistics community.
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